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Can You Have Your Cake and Eat It Too? :
Achieving Capital Gain Treatment While Keeping the Property

By

Ronald H. Jensen

I.

Introduction

Although it is a commonplace—indeed, a statutory requirement—that capital gain
treatment is available only if there is a “sale or exchange,” 1 a surprisingly large body of
caselaw accords that treatment to recoveries for damage to property even if the taxpayer
continues to own the property. 2 Perhaps even more surprising, the IRS has generally—
though not always 3 —acceded to this treatment in litigation, 4 audits, 5 various unpublished
rulings 6 and an acquiescence in a Tax Court decision which endorsed that result. 7
Stranger still is the apparent failure of the courts and the IRS to even recognize they are
ignoring a requirement of the Code.

For example, a field service advice issued in 2002 concerned a taxpayer who
bought land that was subsequently determined to be contaminated. 8 The taxpayer
obtained a settlement from the seller for the costs it incurred in cleaning up the land. The
IRS ruled as follows:

1

Because land is a capital asset, the settlement proceeds represent amounts for
injury or damage to a capital asset. Therefore, the proceeds should be treated as a
recovery of Taxpayer’s basis in the land. Any settlement proceeds in excess of
Taxpayer’s basis in the land should be treated as capital gain. 9

The IRS allowed the taxpayer capital gain treatment even though no sale or exchange
occurred and the taxpayer continued to own and use the property following receipt of the
settlement. Indeed, the IRS did not even allude to the “sale or exchange” requirement.

More recently, it has been suggested that these cases and rulings provide authority
for granting capital gain treatment to shareholders who obtain settlements for corporate
fraud that exceed their basis in the stock even though they continue to own the stock. 10
The commentator advocating this position, a practitioner, wrote that there “have been a
sufficient number of taxpayer victories on capital gain treatment in lawsuit recoveries that
I (most of the time) don’t worry too much about lingering authorities erecting a sale or
exchange hurdle.” 11

I will attempt to show in this article that the cases and rulings dispensing with the
need for a sale or exchange are unjustified under the statutory scheme and prevailing
capital gain jurisprudence, and further that such holdings constitute bad policy.

Part II will set forth a number of examples, based largely on decided cases, where
it has been held or contended that recoveries in excess of basis qualify for capital gain
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treatment even though the taxpayer did not sell or exchange the property. These cases
will illustrate the contexts in which this issue arises and will provide a basis for analysis.
Part III will review how the courts have construed the phrase “sale or exchange.” Part IV
will explore in depth the policy issues involved in according capital gain treatment to
recoveries when no sale or exchange occurs. Part V will consider whether the full amount
of the recovery should be taxed when received or rather (as under current law) treated as
a return of capital with only the excess over basis treated as taxable gain. Part VI will
apply the analysis developed in this article to the examples in Part II. Finally, Part VII
will consider whether section 1234A provides, as some have suggested, an additional
basis for claiming capital gain treatment for a recovery for damage to property.

II.

Some Examples of Capital Gain Treatment in the Absence of a Sale or
Exchange

Most of the following cases illustrate situations where the courts or the IRS have
simply ignored the need for a sale or exchange for capital gain treatment. The others are
hypothetical situations included for analysis.

(1) Restraint of Trade and Price Fixing. Taxpayer was an electrical contractor. An illegal
combination of his competitors prevented him from bidding on numerous contracts and
caused his bids on other jobs to be rejected. As a result, taxpayer’s business goodwill, in
which he had no basis, was damaged. Nevertheless he continued in business. Taxpayer
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sued and recovered damages for the injury to his goodwill. Held: Entire recovery was
taxable as long-term capital gain. 12

(2) Interference with Bank’s Operations. In a dispute with the taxpayer-bank, the Federal
Reserve Bank over an 18-month period sent its agents to the taxpayer’s premises to
demand payment in cash of all checks drawn on the bank. This caused adverse comment
and embarrassment to the taxpayer. Taxpayer sued for damage to its business goodwill,
in which it had no basis, and ultimately received a settlement. Taxpayer continued in
business following the recovery. Held: Entire amount of settlement qualified as long-term
capital gain. 13

(3) Patent infringement: Taxpayer recovered damages from defendant for injury to its
“corporate capital structure” and its “goodwill” as a result of defendant’s infringement of
taxpayer’s patent. Taxpayer retained and continued to exploit its patent following the
recovery. Taxpayer had no basis in its goodwill or capital structure. Held: Entire
recovery qualified as long-term capital gain. 14

(4) Corporate fraud: Taxpayer bought stock in XYZ Corp. for $100 a share and the
stock subsequently appreciated to $1000 a share. As a result of bad management and
fraud the stock declined to $200 a share. Taxpayer sued management and obtained a
recovery of $300 a share. Taxpayer retained the stock. 15 Result: There is no court or
administrative ruling involving a shareholder’s recovery for corporate fraud, but the logic
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of the above cases suggests that taxpayer has a capital gain of $200 a share [$300 a share
recovery – basis of $100 a share = gain of $200 a share]. 16

(5) Soil Erosion: Taxpayer purchased five condominium units from seller. Thereafter,
soil erosion caused by drainage diffusion was detected. Taxpayer sued the seller of the
units and recovered $100,000. Although there was damage from the soil erosion, it was
still possible to rent the units. 17 Result: Although no case has so held, it appears based on
the above cases that the recovery would first be applied against basis with any excess
taxed as capital gain.

(6) Trademark infringement: Taxpayer-corporation alleged that defendant’s trademark,
when used in connection with the sale of batteries, infringed its trademark. Taxpayer
sued for damage to its trademark and associated goodwill. The case was settled for a
cash payment to the taxpayer of $5,000,000. As part of the settlement, the defendant was
allowed to continue to use its trademark in connection with the sale of its batteries and
other products. Taxpayer had no basis in its trademark or the associated goodwill. Held:
The entire recovery qualified as long-term capital gain. 18

III.

What Is a Sale or Exchange?

The Internal Revenue Code grants a preferential tax rate on an individual’s net
long-term capital gain to the extent it exceeds any net short-term capital loss. 19 A longterm capital gain is defined as a gain “from the sale or exchange of a capital asset held
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for more than 1 year.” 20 Consequently, a “sale or exchange” is a sine qua non for
qualifying for the preferential tax rates.

What then is a “sale or exchange?” The courts have construed the term narrowly.
In the leading case of Helvering v. William Flaccus Oak Leather Co., the taxpayer
collected insurance proceeds for the destruction of its plant by fire. 21 The Court rejected
the taxpayer’s assertion the proceeds qualified as a long-term capital gain, holding that
the phrase “sale or exchange” should be given its ordinary meaning. 22 The Court held
that the destruction of the building coupled with collection of the insurance proceeds
could not be considered a “sale,” nor could it be regarded as an “exchange” because that
term “implie[d] reciprocal transfers of capital assets, not a single transfer to compensate
for the destruction of property.” 23 The Court also noted that where Congress intended for
“ambiguous transactions” to be treated as sales or exchanges, it had expressly so
provided. 24 Its failure to do so in the factual setting of Flaccus constituted “convincing
evidence” that Congress did not intend for capital gain treatment to apply in that
situation. 25

Although the Supreme Court took a restrictive view of a “sale or exchange” in
Flaccus, it has held that a “sale” encompasses involuntary or forced transfers of property,
such as foreclosures. 26 Lower courts, taking their clue from Flaccus, have held that a
“sale” also includes a taking of property by eminent domain. 27
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These cases impose a dual requirement for capital gain treatment: the taxpayer’s
interest in his or her property must terminate and such interest must be transferred, either
voluntarily or involuntarily, to another person or entity. In Flaccus, the taxpayer’s
investment in the building terminated with its destruction by fire. However, there was no
“sale or exchange” because the taxpayer’s interest in the building was conveyed to no
one—it had ceased to exist. In foreclosures and eminent domain takings, however, the
taxpayer’s interest in the property both terminates and is transferred to another party, the
purchaser at the foreclosure sale in one case and the government entity exercising
eminent domain in the other. Hence the taxpayer qualifies for capital gain treatment.

Consider how the examples listed in Part II fare under these requirements. In
none of the cases was the taxpayer’s interest in the underlying property terminated.
Moreover, with the possible exception of the trademark infringement case (to be
discussed in greater depth in Part VI) no property interest of the taxpayer was transferred
to another party. As in Flaccus, the taxpayer had simply received compensation for a
loss or damage to his or her property. In short, the cases simply do not satisfy the “sale or
exchange” requirement.

In Flaccus, the Court eschewed judicial enlargement of the phrase “sale or
exchange” beyond its commonly understood meaning since Congress had manifested its
intent to be the arbiter of when “ambiguous transactions” should be treated as sales or
exchanges through its enactment of specific provisions governing such cases. 28 What
was true in 1941 when Flaccus was decided is even truer today. Flaccus cited three
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sections of the Code characterizing “ambiguous transactions” as sales or exchanges. 29 A
recent edition of a popular income tax casebook lists eleven such sections. 30 The case for
judicial expansion of the “sale or exchange” concept is, if anything, weaker than when
Flaccus was decided.

In recent years some courts have relaxed the “sale or exchange” concept in one
respect. Courts previously distinguished between payments received for the cancellation
or surrender of a contractual right or claim (e.g., a payment received for giving up a right
to buy a mine’s output) and payments received for transfer of the right to a third party.
Courts have held there is no sale in the first situation because the “property” (i.e., the
right to buy the coal) “disappears” or is “extinguished” but have found a sale in the
second instance because the property interest (i.e., the right to buy the coal) continues to
exist in the hands of the transferee. 31 However, Judge Friendly, speaking for the Second
Circuit in 1962 in Commissioner v. Ferrer, rejected this distinction as “formalistic:” 32
“Tax law is concerned with substance, here the voluntary passing of ‘property’ rights
allegedly constituting ‘capital assets,’ not with whether they are passed to a stranger or to
a person already having a larger ‘estate.’” 33

Although Judge Friendly’s opinion enlarged the “sale or exchange” concept
beyond the way it was previously understood, 34 his revised formulation would not cover
recoveries for damage or injury to property. When a taxpayer surrenders a contractual
right, the taxpayer terminates his or her interest in that right. When a taxpayer receives
compensation for injury to his or her property but keeps the property, the taxpayer’s
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interest in the property is not terminated. Moreover, when a taxpayer surrenders a
contractual right to the other contracting party (e.g., surrender of a right to buy the mine’s
output to the mine owner), there is, in the words of the Ferrer case, a “passing of
‘property’ rights . . . to a person already having a larger estate” (i.e., the mine owner). 35
When payments are received for damage or injury to a taxpayer’s property, the taxpayer
transfers no interest in his or her property to the payor.

Running through all these cases is the concept that a transfer of the taxpayer’s
interest in property is the irreducible minimum of a sale or exchange. One commentator
has justified this requirement on the ground that one “of the prime (supposed) purposes of
the capital gains rules—to facilitate movements of capital in the marketplace—would not
be implicated when the asset [is not] “transferred.” . . . . [The “sale or exchange”
requirement] is one way the statute ensures that the capital-gains provisions apply only to
assets that come within its historical pedigree.” 36

Is it possible that some of the cases in Part II may be viewed as constructive
sales?” Consider Example (1), Restraint of Trade and Price Fixing, where a taxpayer lost
potential customers to an illegal combination of his competitors that prevented him from
bidding on numerous contracts and caused his bids on other jobs to be rejected. Could
one say that the taxpayer in effect “sold” his right to the customers he lost to his
competitors when he settled the lawsuit for a cash payment?
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The Service rejected a similar contention in Revenue Ruling 74-251. 37 A lawsuit
brought on behalf of taxpayer, a mutual fund, alleged that the shareholders of its
investment advisor had improperly appropriated for their own benefit a portion of the
taxpayer’s “capital fabric, [its] intangible right to select its investment advisor.” 38 A
settlement was reached in which the shareholders of the investment advisor paid the
mutual fund a sum of money. 39 The fund argued that “the taking of its right by [the
investment advisor’s] shareholders, and their subsequent payment for it in [the] form of a
settlement, is tantamount to a sale of such right.” 40 The ruling rejected this argument
stating that while “it may be true that [the investment advisor’s] shareholders used [the
taxpayer’s] right to select an investment advisor to produce a profit for themselves, they
clearly did not purchase such right upon the settlement of the litigation.” 41

This holding seems clearly correct under Supreme Court precedent. In
Flaccus 42 and again in Commissioner v. Brown, 43 the Supreme Court stated that “sale”
and “exchange”—as used in the capital gain provisions—are to be given their common
and ordinary meanings. Settling a lawsuit for misappropriation of the mutual fund’s right
to select its investment advisor, as in Revenue Ruling 74-251, or settling a claim for
stealing the taxpayer’s customers by unlawful practices, as occurred in Example (1),
hardly seems a “purchase” or a “sale” as those terms are commonly understood.

IV. Should Recoveries for Damages to One’s Property in Excess of Basis Receive
Capital Gain Treatment?
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This Part explores whether there is any policy or equitable reason for creating,
either judicially or legislatively, an exception to the rule that the capital gain tax
preference is available only if there is a sale or exchange.

A. Does a Taxpayer’s Recovery for Property Damage Come Within the
Purposes for Which the Capital Gain Tax Preference Was Enacted?

Twice since 1986, Congress has reduced the maximum tax rate applicable to most
long-term capital gains: first in 1997 when the rate was reduced to 20% 44 and then in
2003 when the rate was further reduced to 15%. 45 On both occasions, the applicable
committee reports justified the tax preference on the same two grounds: to encourage
saving, investment and risk taking by increasing the after-tax return on investments
thereby stimulating the economy and to mitigate the so-called “lock-in” effect. 46 Notably
the committee reports made no reference to the “bunching of income” rationale that has
sometimes been used to justify the capital gain tax preference. 47 This rationale justifies
the preference as an ameliorative to the plight of the taxpayer who has held property for
many years during which it has slowly appreciated and then sells the property thereby
recognizing all the appreciation in a single year and causing the taxpayer to be pushed
into an abnormally high tax bracket. 48

Providing relief for taxpayers with bunched income no longer seems to be among
Congress’s purposes in adopting the capital gain tax preference. Even when the 1954
Code was in effect, many tax commentators had concluded that relief from bunching was,
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at most, a minimal concern of Congress. 49 Today, there is much more reason to believe
the Congress was unconcerned about bunched income when it enacted the current capital
gain provisions.

The tax rate schedule on ordinary income has been greatly flattened and the tax
brackets widened. This has substantially diminished the likelihood that recognition of a
capital gain will push a taxpayer into a significantly higher bracket and has reduced the
cost in additional tax if it does. 50 In 1954, the top tax rate on ordinary income was 91%
for individuals; 51 today it is 35%. 52 Moreover, most persons experiencing capital gains
are already in relatively high tax brackets so bunching is not likely to cause the taxpayer
to be pushed into a substantially higher bracket. 53 Indeed, capital gain tax rates are so low
today that they will almost always overcompensate the taxpayer for any bunching. For
example, a taxpayer who realizes a capital gain and whose marginal tax rate on ordinary
income is between 25% and 35% will pay a tax of 15% on the gain. 54 In other words, the
capital gain tax will probably be less than what the tax would have been if the
appreciation in the asset had been taxed as ordinary income as it accrued. 55 Likewise,
taxpayers who experience a capital gain and whose marginal tax rate on ordinary income
is between 10% and 15% will generally pay a tax of 5% (0% beginning 2008) on any
capital gain and will therefore most likely also be overcompensated for any bunching. 56

Other reasons suggest that the current capital gain tax regimen was not designed
to deal with the problem of bunched income. The holding period required for long-term
capital gain relief is a mere one year and a day. 57 Thus a taxpayer whose property reflects
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just one year’s appreciation can qualify for the preference. Finally, the complete absence
of any reference to bunched income in the two most recent committee reports suggests
this is no longer a Congressional concern. Indeed, the sole reference the author has been
able to find in a report of a tax writing committee on the bunched income issue was in
1921—more than 85 years ago. 58

Let’s consider the two reasons for capital gain treatment given in the two most
recent committee reports.

Spurring the economy. Granting capital gain treatment to lawsuit recoveries will
do nothing to spur the economy. People obviously do not consider the relatively arcane
tax issue discussed in this article when deciding to invest or not. It would be shocking if
one percent of the investors were even aware of the issue. Thus, the way this issue is
resolved will have no effect on the amount of money people invest in the economy.
Moreover, such recoveries are rare. Rarer still are the occasions when the recovery
exceeds the investor’s basis in the property—the only time when the capital gain vs.
ordinary income issue arises. The occasions on which both conditions are satisfied (i.e., a
recovery and one that exceeds the taxpayer’s basis) are too few in number, too
unpredictable and too random to have any effect on the level of investment and savings in
the economy.

Mitigating the lock-in effect. A taxpayer who owns an appreciated asset is said to
be “locked-in” when he or she is deterred from selling even though superior investment
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opportunities exist because of the tax he or she would have to pay on the gain. 59 The
lock-in effect is said to have two deleterious consequences. First, it hurts the economy
since capital is inhibited from flowing to its most productive uses, 60 and secondly,
taxable sales are inhibited thereby reducing overall tax revenue. 61

The “lock-in” argument for the capital gain tax preference is that the lower tax
rates will induce or encourage taxpayers to sell appreciated assets when superior
alternative investment opportunities exist by removing the disincentive of high tax rates.
But this has no relevance to cases where a taxpayer receives recoveries for damage or
injury to his property. In these cases, the taxpayer has not been “encouraged” or
“induced” to transfer property or to do anything else; and in fact, the taxpayer has done
nothing. The injury or damage to the taxpayer’s property, which gave rise to the
recoveries, was perpetrated by someone else and was an event over which the taxpayer
exercised no control. As far as the taxpayer was concerned, the injury was both
involuntary and undesired.

In addition, the preferential tax rates in the cases being considered did nothing to
facilitate or encourage the flow of capital to its most productive uses. In these cases, the
taxpayer retained the property while enjoying the preferential tax rate. There was no
movement of capital and none was encouraged. Indeed, the current law works at cross
purposes to the objective of unlocking capital by awarding a tax preference to a taxpayer
who retains an appreciated asset.
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B. Damage to Different Types of Property

(1) Damage to Goodwill—The ”Substitute for Ordinary Income”
Rationale

Virtually all the cases granting capital gain treatment involve recoveries for
damage to goodwill or similar intangibles. 62 Examples (1) through (3) and (6) in Part II
are illustrative of these cases. Note that in each case, the taxpayer retained the underlying
property, that is, the business that generated the goodwill.

A recovery for damaged goodwill is simply a prepayment of amounts which, if
received in the normal course, would be taxable as ordinary income. “Goodwill” has been
defined by the IRS and others as the ability of a business to earn profits in excess of the
fair return on net tangible assets. 63 When a business’s goodwill is damaged, its ability to
earn income is reduced. 64 Therefore, a recovery for the damage to goodwill is a
replacement of the future profits that will no longer be earned because of the damage,
reduced to present value. 65 Bestowing capital gain treatment on such a recovery
transmutes amounts that would otherwise be taxed as ordinary income into capital gain.

The courts’ practice of allowing taxpayers to quantify damage to goodwill by
introducing evidence on the amount of income earned before and after the injury shows
the ordinary income nature of such recoveries. One court, in responding to the IRS’s
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contention that the use of such evidence showed that the amount of the recovery was lost
profits, stated that “[p]rofits were one of the chief indications of the worth of the
business; but the usual earnings before the injury, as compared with those afterward,
were only an evidential factor in determining actual loss and not an independent basis for
recovery.” 66 What the court apparently did not realize is that goodwill is simply the
present value of future anticipated earnings. It has no “independent” existence apart from
earnings. 67 In contrast, many state courts recognize the identity of goodwill and future
income by prohibiting a party from recovering damages for both loss of goodwill and loss
of future profits for the same time period, noting that to do so would constitute a double
recovery. 68

Many commentators have criticized the “substitute for ordinary income” rationale
as articulated by the Supreme Court in cases such as Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, Inc. 69
as being too broad. 70 They point out that the rationale, applied literally, “would negate
the possibility of capital gain treatment” since “any asset can be described as a right to
future income, and since any sale for value yields the present-value equivalent of the
future income from the asset.” 71 For example, the price received for the sale of stock
reflects, among other items, the corporation’s retained earnings which if distributed
would be taxable as ordinary income. More broadly, the value of any income-producing
asset consists largely, if not entirely, of the present value of its anticipated future
earnings. 72
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Most commentators have distinguished these examples from P.G. Lake, Inc. and
similar cases denying capital gain treatment by pointing out that such cases involved
“carve outs,” that is, a sale of a partial interest unaccompanied by the disposition of the
underlying property. 73 Professor Del Cotto would deny capital gain treatment in P.G.
Lake, Inc. because, as the Supreme Court itself emphasized, there was no conversion of
the taxpayer’s capital investment. 74 In Del Cotto’s view, a taxpayer’s investment is in
the income-producing property—not the income it throws off. 75 Just as there is no
conversion of a fee owner’s investment when he “sells” a lease to a lessee (i.e., rents the
property)—since he retains ownership of the underlying real estate—there was no
conversion of the taxpayer’s capital in P.G. Lake, Inc where the taxpayer also retained
ownership of the property that produced the income. 76 Professor Chirelstein justifies the
result in P.G. Lake, Inc. by noting that if a shareholder could receive capital gain
treatment by “selling” a right to his dividends for a fixed term, the shareholder could
again “sell” his rights to the dividends for another fixed term when the original term
expired, and could repeat this process indefinitely. 77 The result would be that “periodic
investment income could be converted into capital gain contrary to the evident intent of
Congress.” 78 These problems do not exist where the taxpayer does not retain an interest
in the underlying property. 79

The issue in this section, though, is not whether the cases being considered here
are governed by the holding of P.G. Lake, Inc., either as baldly stated by the Supreme
Court or as limited by the commentators, although they may be. 80 It has already been
shown that these cases do not involve sales or exchanges and thus do not merit capital

17

gain treatment under the statute. The issue here is not a legal one but whether there is
any equitable or policy reason justifying a departure, either by the legislature or the
courts, from that requirement. In assessing this issue, two factors seem to be of
paramount importance.

First, bestowing capital gain treatment on such recoveries does not further the
purposes for which the preference was enacted. 81 The prospect of a recovery in excess of
basis is too remote, uncertain and speculative to affect investment decisions. Indeed, it is
unlikely that a prospective investor even thinks about the tax ramifications of such a
recovery when deciding to invest. Likewise, according capital gain treatment in these
cases does not encourage or induce the taxpayer to unlock capital. The damage to the
taxpayer’s property which gave rise to the recoveries was perpetrated by someone else.
The taxpayer was not “encouraged” or “induced” to do anything and did nothing.
Secondly, according capital gain treatment to such recoveries would bestow the
capital gain tax preference on amounts that would otherwise be taxed as ordinary
income. 82 There is no good reason why amounts otherwise taxable as ordinary income
should receive preferential treatment simply because the payment is accelerated, unless
there is a countervailing consideration. Furthering the purposes of the capital gain
preference may constitute such a consideration, but as shown above that is not the case
here.
It is of course possible that the recovery will present a “bunching of income”
problem although with the current tax rate schedule this is less likely to occur, and if it
does, the impact is not likely to be severe. As noted above, it does not seem that the
18

current capital gain structure was intended to deal with this problem. 83 In any event, it
would be bad tax policy for the judiciary to extend capital gain treatment to recoveries for
damage to goodwill out of a misguided attempt to do justice. To do so would confer
benefits on many undeserving taxpayers. It would, for example, permit most taxpayers to
pay a lower rate of tax on the capital gain than their normal rate of tax thus
overcompensating them for the bunching. 84 It would permit taxpayers who had held their
property for little as a year and a day and other short periods, and who therefore are not
the victims of bunching, to receive the benefit as well as those who had held their
property for many years. 85
Taxpayers can always assure themselves of capital gain treatment for the recovery
even under the rule proposed above by selling the underlying property, assuming it is a
capital asset, on or before receipt of the recovery. In one case, the IRS proposed, and the
court agreed, that a lawsuit recovery with respect to real property received after the
taxpayer sold the property qualified for capital gain treatment. 86 In another case, the
court noted there was no requirement that a payment be paid by the buyer for it to be
considered part of the amount realized on the sale. 87 These cases are correct and should
be followed. When these conditions have been satisfied, the taxpayer has both
terminated his interest in the property and transferred it to another. Capital gain
treatment is therefore appropriate.
The tax effects when this strategy is used are as follows. If the sale of the
underlying property results in a gain, the combined amount of that gain and the recovery
will be taxed as capital gain. Likewise, if the sale of the underlying property results in a
loss that is less than the recovery, the net amount will be taxed as a capital gain. On the
19

other hand if the sale of the underlying property results in a loss that exceeds the
recovery, then the net amount will be a capital loss. Even here the recovery is effectively
treated as a capital gain since its effect is to offset the capital loss. Taxpayers wishing to
resume ownership of the investment may do so by repurchasing the property. However,
if a loss is realized on the sale of the underlying property, taxpayers wishing to obtain the
tax benefit of that loss must ensure that the sale and repurchase have economic
substance 88 and, in the case of stock or securities, that they do not run afoul of the “wash
sale” provisions. 89

An intriguing issue is whether a taxpayer whose goodwill has been partially
damaged can obtain capital gain treatment under section 1231(a)(3)(A)(ii). To
oversimplify a complex provision, it provides for capital gain treatment in the case of an
“involuntary conversion (as a result of destruction in whole or in part . . . of . . . any
capital asset which is held for more than 1 year and is held in connection with a trade or
business . . . .” 90 Goodwill is a capital asset. 91 Can a taxpayer therefore successfully
claim that damage to its goodwill constitutes a partial destruction of a capital asset? This
is unlikely.

The allowance of capital gain treatment for partial destruction was undoubtedly
intended to apply when an identifiable part of the property was destroyed. Thus, if the
third floor of an office building was destroyed by fire while the first two floors escaped
damage, the recovery for the third floor (less its allocable basis) would qualify for capital
gain treatment since the fire partially destroyed the building. The difficulty in the case of
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goodwill is the inability to identify the specific part of the goodwill destroyed. Goodwill
is viewed as an indivisible whole, not an aggregation of discrete, identifiable sub-units. 92
In Mathey v. Commissioner, the taxpayer argued that infringement of its patent and the
resulting loss in its value constituted a partial destruction of the patent. 93 The court
rejected the claim stating that “there has been no showing that any particular part of the
patent . . . was destroyed or converted (emphasis added).” 94 . Significantly, none of the
courts granting capital gain treatment for a recovery for damage to goodwill have relied
on section 1231(a)(3)(A)(ii) but rather on the general principles discussed in this article.

If a taxpayer’s goodwill were completely destroyed, there would be no need to
identify a specific part of the goodwill as destroyed, and capital gain treatment under
section 1231(a)(3)(A)(ii) would seem appropriate.
(2) Damage to Income-Producing Business or Investment Property

Although the capital gain issue mostly arises in cases involving damage or injury
to the taxpayer’s goodwill, the above analysis can also be applied to recoveries for
damage to any type of income-producing property. For present purposes, we may
assume (subject to later refinement) that the value of income-producing property is the
sum of all future income from the property discounted to present value. 95 A loss in value
for injury or damage to such property reflects the loss in its earning capacity.
Consequently, a recovery is simply the present value of the income that will not be
earned because of the damage. Put differently, it is a substitute for earnings that would
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have been taxed as ordinary income. The result here should be the same as it was in the
case of recoveries for damage to goodwill—no capital gain treatment.

(3) Damage to Non-Income Producing “Personal” Property

Suppose H owns his residence and that his property is contaminated by waste
discharged by an adjoining landowner. H sues and recovers a judgment for the amount of
decline in the property’s value caused by the contamination. The amount of the recovery
exceeds H’s basis in the property. 96

At first it would seem that the “substitute for ordinary income” rationale could not
be applied here, since H is not being compensated for something that would have been
taxed as ordinary income. However, the loss in the value of H’s property simply reflects
a decline in the property’s “use value,” that is, the amount it could be rented for.
(Expressed differently, the loss in the property’s value is the sum of all future losses in
potential rent discounted to present value.) H, who is knowledgeable about tax matters,
replies this makes no difference because the imputed rental value of owner-occupied real
property is not taxable to the owner. Consequently, the amount received by H cannot be
viewed as a substitute for ordinary income and should not be taxed as such.

H is correct that the imputed rental value of owner-occupied income is not taxed
by the IRS to the owner. 97 Yet it is also clear that “imputed rent” comes within the
concept of “income” under modern tax caselaw 98 and is also “income” in the economic
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sense. 99 It is, for example, a clear “accession to wealth” since the taxpayer’s use of his
property as his residence benefits him by relieving him of the need to spend his own
funds for lodging. 100 The primary reason for not taxing imputed rental today is
administrative—not conceptual. 101 If imputed rental were to be taxed, every taxpayer in
the United States who owns his or her residence would need to compute the property’s
imputed rental income. This would entail not only determining its gross rental value but
also all allowable deductions. Such an expansion of the “taxable income” concept would
substantially increase, perhaps to the breaking point, both the compliance burdens of the
taxpayers and the IRS’s monitoring responsibilities. Another reason for not taxing
imputed rental value might be a concern that “the entire concept would be regarded by
taxpayers as somewhat strange and theoretical.” 102

These reasons do not justify taxing recoveries as anything other than ordinary
income. The valuation problem no longer exists when there is a recovery. The recovery
fixes the amount of the loss. Indeed, we can have some confidence in the accuracy of the
amount determined since it was either determined by the parties themselves dealing at
arm’s length or by a neutral third-party fact finder (e.g., a judge, jury or arbitrator). It
may be true that taxpayers frequently find the concept of a non-cash benefit, such as
imputed rental value, being taxable “strange and theoretical.” 103 However, the recoveries
under discussion are almost always paid in cash, and taxpayers have come to regard any
cash receipt as presumptively taxable. This is especially true when—as is almost always
the case—the taxpayer is free to spend the cash in any manner he or she wishes. Finally,
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they might very well find it “strange,” although welcome, that such a taxable cash receipt
qualifies for capital gain treatment.

When a taxpayer receives a payment for damage to his residence, he or she is in
effect being compensated for a reduction in the property’s use value (i.e., its imputed
rent). Economically, the amount of the damage is the present value of the all future
reductions in the imputed rent. Such imputed rent is “income” in an economic sense.
Moreover, the imputed rent, if it were taxed, would be “ordinary income” since it is
considered expended for the use of property. 104 Consequently, a taxpayer who receives a
recovery for damage to his residence is receiving a substitute for “ordinary income,” and
it should be taxed as such.

(4) Damage to Business or Investment Property Not Generating
Current Income

A different analysis is required when the property does not throw off any income.
Consider taxpayer T who buys a “growth stock” in a company that has a no-dividend
policy but instead plows all earnings back into the business. T’s purpose in buying the
stock was to realize capital gains upon the sale of the stock in the future. Assume further
that a group of executives “loot” the company causing a loss in the stock’s market value.
A class action is brought against the executives who settle the claims by making a large
cash payment to the shareholders. Because T “got in on the ground floor,” she has a low
basis. Her share of the recovery exceeds her basis. How should such excess be taxed?

24

T would object to taxing the excess as ordinary income. She would argue that
the stock paid no dividends and thus the only income she could ever realize from the
stock (i.e., gain on its sale) would be a capital gain. Thus the recovery (i.e.,
compensation for the loss in the value of the stock) is not a substitute for ordinary income
but is rather a substitute for an amount that would have been taxed as capital gain.

Consider another example. O owns Blackacre, a parcel of unimproved land,
which he is holding for future appreciation. O derives no income from Blackacre. O’s
plan is to sell the property for a capital gain when its value reaches a certain level. O’s
neighbor pollutes O’s land. O sues and receives a settlement for the pollution from his
neighbor that exceeds his basis.

Like T, O would vigorously object to treating the excess as ordinary income. O
would argue that he was receiving no income from the property and that the only income
that he might potentially receive (i.e., gain from the sale of Blackacre) would qualify for
capital gain treatment. The recovery for loss in the value of Blackacre is not a substitute
for ordinary income but is instead a recovery for an amount that would otherwise be
taxed as capital gain. T and O would also argue that taxing the recoveries as ordinary
income is especially unfair since the recoveries did not result from their voluntary actions
but from the actions of others. The income has been thrust upon them.
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The trouble with these arguments is that they depend upon an unacceptable but
unavoidable degree of speculation. One may invest in a stock that currently pays no
dividends with the hope and expectation that the company’s earnings will be plowed back
into the business thereby boosting the stock’s value and ultimately resulting in a capital
gain upon the stock’s sale. However, one can never be sure that the earnings currently
being accumulated by the corporation will not some day be paid out as dividends.
Microsoft, Inc. paid no dividends for the first 28 years of its existence. 105 It then adopted
a practice of regular quarterly dividends beginning in 2003 that continues through today,
and in 2004, it paid a mammoth one-time special dividend of $32 billion, the largest
payout in corporate history. 106

Likewise, there is no assurance that the realization of gain on land currently held
as an investment will be taxed as capital gain. The cases are legion where a taxpayer
bought and held land as an investment (i.e., a capital asset) intending to sell it at some
later time for capital gain but who then changed his purpose and became a “developer.”
The taxpayer will realize ordinary income on the sale of the lots. 107 Moreover, the entire
gain is ordinary income even if the overwhelming bulk of the appreciation occurred when
the property was held as an investment. 108

Obviously, the case for denying capital gain treatment is not as clear here as it
was in the case of recoveries for damage to goodwill. There is a certain unfairness in
taxing as ordinary income a recovery for an amount which had it been realized as
anticipated would have qualified for capital gain treatment; the taxpayer may feel that his
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anticipated capital gain has been transmuted into ordinary income. However, bestowing
capital gain treatment on these recoveries, as in the cases discussed above, does nothing
to further the preference’s purpose of encouraging the mobility of capital and stimulating
the economy. Further, taxpayers in these situations are unable to demonstrate that their
recoveries actually represent amounts that would ultimately be taxed as capital gain.
Capital gain treatment is a tax preference and the taxpayers must be able to demonstrate
their entitlement to it. This is properly a heavy burden. As the Supreme Court has noted,
since capital gain treatment “is an exception from the normal tax requirements of the
Internal Revenue Code, the definition of capital asset must be narrowly applied and its
exclusion interpreted broadly. This is necessary to effectuate the basic congressional
purpose.” 109 The scales still tip against allowing capital gain treatment.

As noted above, a taxpayer can still assure herself of capital gain treatment in
these cases by selling the underlying income-producing property on or before receipt of
the recovery. 110

(5) Damage to Mixed Property

Up to this point, we have artificially divided property and their associated
recoveries into two neat categories: (1) income-producing property where the recovery is
a substitute for amounts that would be taxed as ordinary income if received in the normal
course; and (2) property generating no current income where the recovery is a substitute
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for amounts that would likely, though not necessarily, be taxed as capital gain. Needless
to say this is an artificial division. The current value of a property generally reflects both
its income-producing potential and its potential for capital gain. 111 We can now deal with
these “mixed” cases. To the extent that a recovery compensates for a decline in incomeproducing capacity, the recovery should be taxed as ordinary income since it is a
substitute for amounts that would have been received and taxed as ordinary income. To
the extent that the recovery compensates for a loss of potential future capital gain,
ordinary income treatment is still appropriate because the taxpayer will be unable to
demonstrate with certainty that the forgone income would have been taxed as capital
gain.

(6 ) Damage to Real Property or Depreciable Property Used in a
Trade or Business and To Personal Property—Preemption by Statute

Generally, the above analyses are equally valid when applied to real property or
depreciable property used in the taxpayer’s trade or business as to other property.
However, this type of property raises a distinct issue. Section 1231 governs the tax
treatment of a disposition or deemed disposition of real property and depreciable property
used in the taxpayer’s trade or business that the taxpayer has held for more than one year.
To oversimplify this complex provision, section 1231(a)(3)(A)(ii), calls for capital gain
treatment where there is a compulsory or involuntary conversion of such property into
money or other property “as a result of destruction in whole or in part . . . .” The IRS and
the courts have liberally construed “destruction.” Physical obliteration is not required. It
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is sufficient if the property is rendered unfit for its intended purpose. 112 Nevertheless, the
word “destruction” is not infinitely malleable. “Damage” and “destruction” are not
coextensive, and not every case of “damage” amounts to “destruction.” 113

How should a recovery be taxed if the damage does not rise to the level of either
partial or complete destruction? Under the cases discussed in this article, the amount of
the recovery in excess of basis would be taxed as capital gain even though it would not
qualify for such treatment under section 1231. This disparity is bothersome. Congress
has passed a comprehensive statute specifying when gains from involuntary conversions
of this type of property are to be taxed as a capital gain. It seems improper for the courts,
applying their own rule, to accord capital gain treatment to a case when the statute
dealing with the same subject matter (i.e., involuntary conversions) would deny it that
treatment. 114 Furthermore, section 1231 by requiring “destruction”—rather than mere
“damage”—reaffirms the fundamental principle that the taxpayer’s interest in the
property must terminate to qualify for capital gain treatment. The congressional rule,
section 1231, should prevail.

A similar point can be made about “personal” property, that is, property not used
in a trade or business and not acquired in a transaction entered into for profit. Section
165(h)(2)(B) provides individuals with capital gain treatment if the gains arising from the
involuntary conversion of such property due to a casualty exceed the taxpayer’s personal
casualty losses. However, not every case of property damage amounts to a casualty.
“Casualty” denotes an “identifiable event of a sudden, unexpected, or unusual nature …
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[but] damage or loss resulting from progressive deterioration of property through a
steadily operating cause would not be a casualty loss.” 115 Thus loss to property caused by
a flood is a casualty loss, but a loss caused by the gradual erosion or inundation occurring
at normal water levels is not. Suppose a residence is damaged by gradual erosion
occurring at normal water levels and the recovery exceeds basis. The gain would clearly
not qualify for capital gain treatment under Section 165(h)(2)(B) since there is no
casualty, but it would under the general principles established by the cases discussed in
this article. Capital gain treatment should not be allowed. Congress has spoken on when
a gain from the involuntary conversion of personal property is to be taxed as a capital
gain, and courts should not undermine that rule by extending such treatment to cases not
covered by the statute.

(7) Does taxing recoveries as ordinary income create disparate tax
treatment for economically identical transactions?

A reviewer of this article in draft form suggested that taxing recoveries as
ordinary income could cause economically identical transactions to be taxed in
significantly different ways. He posited four thought provoking hypothetical cases. In
each instance, a defect is discovered in the taxpayer’s land reducing its fair market value
from $1,000 to $700. Taxpayer’s basis in the land is $100. Under state law, the person
who sold the land to the taxpayer is liable for the loss in market value.
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(1) Taxpayer sells the land along with his claim for damages for a total
consideration of $1000: $300 for the claim and $700 for the land. Taxpayer
realizes a capital gain of $900.

(2) Taxpayer recovers $300 from the seller in the lawsuit and then sells the land
for its reduced value of $700. If the recovery is taxed as ordinary income, the
taxpayer will have $300 of ordinary income on the recovery and $600 of
capital gain on the sale.

(3) Taxpayer spends $300 to fix the defect in the land increasing its fair market
value to $1000 and his basis in the land to $400. He then recovers $300 in the
suit (reducing his basis to $100 again) and then sells the land for $1000. The
taxpayer recognizes a capital gain of $900.

(4) Taxpayer recovers $300 from the seller in the lawsuit, uses the $300 to fix the
defect (thereby increasing his basis in the land to $400), and then sells the
land for $1000. If the recovery is taxed as ordinary income, the taxpayer will
recognize $300 of ordinary income on the recovery and $600 of capital gain
on the subsequent sale.

The reviewer states that while the economic consequences in all four cases are the
same, capital gain treatment is accorded to the full amount realized in two cases but is
partially denied in the others.
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All four cases assume that the taxpayer ultimately sells the property. However,
except for the first case, it is not clear whether the taxpayer’s ultimate sale of the property
occurs in connection with the recovery. In the three other cases, the taxpayer—so far as
the facts reveal—was free when he received the recovery to keep the property for a year
or for twenty years, or indeed for the rest of his life. However, the relationship between
the recovery and the ultimate sale is crucial. Suppose the recovery occurs in Year 1 and
the sale, which is unconnected with the recovery, occurs in Year 5. The recovery should
clearly be taxed as ordinary income. The principal purpose of the capital gain tax
preference is to encourage taxpayers to shift capital to its most productive uses by
reducing the tax cost they incur in selling their property. 116 Here the taxpayer was not
“encouraged” or “induced” to do anything and in fact did nothing. The action that gave
rise to the recovery was not that of the taxpayer but rather the wrongful act of a third
party. Moreover, the taxpayer did not convert his investment but continued to hold it for
five years until he sold it in an unrelated transaction. The policy of the capital gain
provision is simply not implicated in this situation.

Perhaps implicit in the above hypotheticals is the notion that since the recovery
reduces the amount that may be realized on a future sale of the property, it should be
accorded the same tax treatment as if it were realized on such a sale. However, amounts
realized from property often reduce the amount that may be realized in a future sale, yet
such amounts are typically taxed as ordinary income. Perhaps the most common example
is corporate stock. A corporation by retaining earnings bolsters the value of its stock and
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thereby increases the amount its shareholders may receive by selling their stock.
Contrariwise, a corporation by paying out its earnings as dividends reduces the amount
that its shareholders will realize by selling their stock. Nevertheless dividends are taxed
as ordinary income. Or consider an inventor who receives a patent on his invention. If
the inventor makes an outright sale of the patent, the amount realized—which of course is
simply the discounted value of its anticipated future income—qualifies for capital gain
treatment. 117 On the other hand, the inventor may license the patent for a period, say five
years, and then sell the patent. The licensing of the patent for five years reduces the
amount that will be realized on the patent’s disposition; nevertheless the royalties
received during those years are taxable as ordinary income.

These examples illustrate that merely because a payment reduces the amount that
may be realized on a future sale (and hence the amount that qualifies as a capital gain)
does not entitle it to capital gain treatment. In the two examples given above, the reason
for denying capital gain treatment to the payments (i.e., dividends and royalties), even
though they reduce the amount that may be realized on the ultimate sale of the property,
is that the goal of the capital gain tax preference—to encourage the flow of capital—was
not achieved when the amounts were received.

However, capital gain treatment is appropriate when a recovery occurs (or its
value is realized) in connection with the sale or exchange of the underlying property. In
such cases, the taxpayer is terminating his investment in the property and transferring it
to another. The policy of the capital gain preference of encouraging the conversion of
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capital is therefore achieved. 118 The trick is to identify when a recovery is received (or
its value realized) in connection with a sale or exchange of the underlying property. The
hypothetical cases above are helpful in illustrating the need to identity such situations so
that disparate tax treatment can be avoided when the policies of the capital gain tax
preference are fulfilled.

The policy is satisfied if the claim is sold along with the underlying property as in
Case (1). Moreover, as pointed out elsewhere in this article, it is satisfied if the
underlying property is sold before the recovery is received. 119 In both instances, the
taxpayer has completely and unambiguously terminated his investment in the underlying
property. Closer cases may be envisioned. Suppose a taxpayer whose property is
damaged puts it up for sale and simultaneously pursues his claim for damages. The
taxpayer recovers the claim a few days before he sells the property. Here, at least some
uncertainty existed at the time of the recovery whether the property would be sold.
Assuming the taxpayer can establish that his offer to sell the underlying property was
made in good faith and that the sale in fact occurs within a reasonable time after the
recovery is received, capital gain treatment seems appropriate. In other cases, it may be
more difficult to determine whether the sale and the recovery are sufficiently intertwined
to justify capital gain treatment. Probably the best solution is for the courts to resolve
this question by applying principles analogous to those of the step transaction doctrine.
Courts are accustomed to handling problems of this nature, for example, in determining
whether a redemption of a taxpayer’s stock and the subsequent sale of his or her

34

remaining stock are parts of a single, integrated transaction thereby qualifying the
redemption as a complete termination of interest. 120

Cases (3) and (4) raise another issue. By spending $300 to fix the defect before
receipt of the recovery in Case (3), the entire $900 receives capital gain treatment, while
in Case (4) where the taxpayer fixed the defect after receiving the recovery he has $300
of ordinary income and $600 of capital gains. However, the underlying cause for the
disparate treatment is not the treatment of the recovery but the rule that a taxpayer
generally may not increase his basis in property until he makes (and in the cash of a cashbasis taxpayer, pays for) an improvement in the property. 121 Even if recoveries were
always taxed as capital gain, disparate treatment could still occur. For example, assume
the $300 recovery occurs in Year 1 and the property is sold in Year 2. If the defect in the
land is fixed before the recovery, the taxpayer would have no income in Year 1. [The
improvement would increase taxpayer’s basis in the land to $400 so the $300 recovery
would merely reduce his basis back to $100.] On the other hand, if the recovery occurred
before correction of the problem, the taxpayer would have a $200 capital gain in Year 1
[i.e., the $300 recovery minus basis of $100].

Since the disparity in results inheres in the timing of the improvement, its
existence does not resolve whether a recovery should receive capital gain treatment. That
issue can be decided only in light of the policies underlying the capital gain preference.
Where the recovery occurs in connection with a sale of the underlying property, those
policies are satisfied. Otherwise they are not and ordinary income treatment is proper.
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V. Should a Taxpayer Be Allowed to First Offset the Amount Recovered for
Damage to Property Against Basis, or Should the Entire Recovery Be Taxed?

The previous discussion necessarily raises the issue of whether the taxpayer
should even be allowed to offset a recovery against his or her basis in the property.
Perhaps the taxpayer should be required to recognize the entire recovery as income. One
could certainly make a plausible argument—somewhat along the lines of those made in
the prior sections—that since the taxpayer continues to own the property and since the
recovery is a realization with respect to the property, almost invariably in the form of
money, it should be taxed in full as income.

There are a number of reasons why this argument should not prevail. The
relevant statutory provisions are different. Qualification for the preferential tax rate
requires a “sale or exchange.” 122 In contrast, the statute providing for a reduction in basis
requires only that an item be “properly chargeable to the capital account”—a more elastic
concept than “sale or exchange.” 123

The most important consideration though is fairness. Consider this example. C
buys a business and pays $1,000,000 for its goodwill. A competitor unfairly disparages
the business causing the value of its goodwill to plunge to $700,000. C sues and recovers
$300,000 for the damage to the goodwill. Requiring the $300,000 to be taxed in this case
seems intuitively unjust. C has not realized any economic gain; he has simply recovered
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the amount of his loss. 124 It is a “wash.” Put differently, requiring C to recognize the
$300,000 recovery has the immediate result of taxing income twice—one of the purposes
that basis is designed to avoid. 125 . The $1,000,000 of cash C used to buy the goodwill
has presumably already been taxed (e.g., as compensation, profits, etc.). Requiring C to
pay tax on the $300,000 he recovered for the damage to the goodwill makes him pay a
tax on that amount again.

An argument might be made that allowing the taxpayer to simply reduce basis
instead of recognizing the recovery as income undermines congressional policy. It would
run as follows. Allowing a taxpayer to offset the recovery against the basis of the
damaged property (the “basis offset approach”) is the functional equivalent of first
allowing a deduction for the loss in value and then taxing the recovery as income (the
“deduction/income approach”). 126 The law, however, prohibits a deduction for a mere
decline in value. 127 The basis offset approach thus undermines congressional policy by
indirectly allowing a deduction that Congress did not authorize.

The fallacy in this syllogism lies in its premise. The basis offset approach is not
the same as the deduction/income approach; its effect is far more limited. 128 The basis
offset approach never provides the taxpayer with an overall deduction, since the implicit
deduction for the loss is limited to the amount of the recovery. This method merely
relieves the taxpayer from recognizing income when there is no economic gain. In
contrast, allowing the deduction and taxing the recovery—the deduction/income

37

approach—would allow a full deduction for the loss in value, and if the loss exceeds the
recovery, will give the taxpayer an overall deduction. 129

Assume that taxpayer D bought a stock for $200,000. Corporate insiders looted
the corporation causing D’s stock to lose $60,000 in value. D recovers $40,000 from the
insiders as her portion of a settlement of a class action lawsuit brought against them.

Under the deduction/income approach, D would have a deduction of $60,000 for
the loss in value and would then be taxed on the $40,000 recovery, resulting in an overall
deduction of $20,000. In contrast, D would have no net deduction under the basis offset
approach. The only tax effect of the basis offset approach is to reduce D’s basis by the
$40,000 recovery. Thus the implicit deduction is limited to the amount of the recovery,
that is, $40,000. Overall D has $20,000 less taxable income under the deduction/income
approach than under the basis offset approach. This reduced taxable income is
counterbalanced by $20,000 of less basis, 130 but a $20,000 reduction in taxable income is
worth far more than an extra $20,000 of basis.

To determine whether the basis offset approach undermines congressional policy
requires an examination of the policies underlying the denial of a deduction for a loss in
value. The denial is rooted in the realization doctrine. 131 Just as a taxpayer does not
recognize unrealized appreciation, so he or she may not recognize an unrealized loss.
The realization doctrine is defended today on the ground of administrative efficiency.
Requiring taxpayers to value all their assets annually would be costly and burdensome. 132
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Determining value would often be difficult and contentious. Further the IRS lacks to the
resources to effectively monitor and enforce such a system. None of these problems arise
under the basis offset approach. Use of this approach does not require taxpayers to value
all their assets annually nor does it perceptibly increase the enforcement burdens on the
IRS. The offset basis approach and the realization doctrine can live quite comfortably
together; there is no conflict between them. The basis offset approach method is just and
proper and has been consistently allowed by the IRS. 133

There is, however, a problem with the approach that seems to have gone
unrecognized. In many cases, taxpayers may have been able to offset the recovery with
an excessive amount of basis. This, in turn, may allow taxpayers to improperly avoid
recognizing taxable income. Consider this situation. E buys a business and pays
$300,000 for its goodwill. After acquiring the business, E through an aggressive
advertising campaign and the hard work of his talented staff and employees, is able to
increase the business’s goodwill to $1,000,000. E’s unscrupulous competitor begins a
campaign disparaging E’s business, thereby reducing the value of the goodwill to
$800,000. E sues and receives $200,000 for damage to goodwill. Because advertising
and employee salaries are deductible, E has a zero basis in the goodwill that was created
after E’s acquisition of the business.

It is probable that E will be allowed to offset the entire $200,000 recovery against
the $300,000 basis he has in the purchased goodwill with the result that none of the
$200,000 is taxable. This does not reflect economic reality. The campaign of
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disparagement reduced the earning capacity of E’s business as a whole. It harmed both
the goodwill E purchased and the goodwill he and his business were able to create.
Clearly an allocation is required. In the absence of any other information, the allocation
should be pro-rata. Thirty percent of the recovery and thirty percent of the basis should be
allocated to the purchased goodwill, since thirty percent of the business’s entire goodwill
was purchased [$300,000 out of $1,000,000], and the remainder of those items should be
allocated to the self-created goodwill. As shown below, a proper allocation results in a
significant amount of taxable income.

Purchased Goodwill

Basis in purchased goodwill

$300,000

Less: Portion of recovery allocable
to purchased goodwill (30%)

60,000

Basis in purchased goodwill as adjusted

$240,000

Self-Created Goodwill

Portion of recovery allocable
to self-created goodwill (70%)

$140,000

Less: Basis in self-created goodwill

-0-

Taxable income

$140,000
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This sort of misallocation appears to have occurred in State Fish Corp. v
Commissioner, 134 although to only a minor degree. Taxpayer bought a business for
$25,000 of which $18,000 was allocated to goodwill in the purchase agreement. After the
sale, the seller successfully solicited customers away from the taxpayer’ business in
violation of his covenant not to compete. The taxpayer sued and recovered about $9,500
for damage to the business’s goodwill. The court permitted the taxpayer to offset the
entire $9,500 against his $18,000 basis in goodwill resulting in no taxable income.
However, the facts showed that not only did the seller successfully solicit individuals and
businesses who were customers before the sale but also “new customers acquired by [the
taxpayer] after purchasing the business.” It seems probable that the new customers reflect
new goodwill and that it was error to allow the taxpayer to offset his entire award against
the goodwill existing at the time of the sale.

This phenomenon may occur in different contexts. Suppose a company buys a
patent. To convert the patent into a popular selling product on the mass market, the
company incurs large expenditures for labor and advertising. Since these items are
deductible, the company has a zero basis in the goodwill it creates. The company
subsequently receives a recovery from a competitor for unfair disparagement. Allocating
the entire recovery against the company’s basis in the patent while ignoring its selfcreated goodwill will produce the same type of distortion illustrated above.
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The IRS may decide to go along with the commonly accepted approach in most
cases in view of the difficulties of proof and the limited amount of money involved.
Nevertheless, the principle discussed above is valid, and the IRS should be permitted to
press for allocating a recovery between purchased and self-created goodwill where it
determines that the tax dollars at stake are sufficiently high. Establishing an allocation
would not appear to be an insurmountable task. 135

VI.

Discussion of Examples Presented in Part II
With the possible exception of Example 6 (trademark infringement), capital gain

treatment should be denied in each of the examples mentioned in Part II for the simple
reason that no sale or exchange took place. A sale or exchange is a precondition to
capital gain treatment, and the caselaw makes it clear that the recoveries in all the
examples (again with the possible exception of Example 6) do not constitute a sale or
exchange. Since there is a clear failure to satisfy the statute, the focus of this Part will be
on the policy issues involved.
First note that in none of the examples (again with the possible exception of
Example 6) is the policy of the capital gain preference of encouraging the mobility of
capital furthered since the taxpayer may, under current rules, enjoy the preference while
retaining the property.

Examples 1 through 3—involving restraint of trade, interference with banking
operations and patent infringement—present the weakest cases for capital gain treatment.
Each involved recoveries for damage to the taxpayers’ goodwill, that is to say, loss of
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future earnings, and consequently the recoveries are simply substitutes for amounts that
would otherwise be taxed as ordinary income.

In Example 4—the corporate fraud example—the taxpayer’s stock lost value
because of the fraud and mismanagement of insiders. The taxpayer recouped his loss in a
lawsuit award. Unlike Examples 1 through 3, the award is not clearly a substitute for an
amount otherwise taxable as ordinary income (i.e., dividends); it may well be a
replacement for lost future capital gains. Many companies in the recent corporate fraud
scandals followed a no-dividend policy, and their shareholders looked for gain upon the
future sale of their stock as their only potential reward for their investment. However, as
pointed out above, there can be no assurance that a no-dividend policy would remain in
effect forever or that the shareholders’ anticipated capital gains would ever materialize.
In light of this uncertainty—combined with the fact that bestowing the capital gain
preference here does not further the congressional purposes for enacting it—the taxpayer
should lose. The long-term capital gain tax rate is an extraordinary preference, and the
taxpayer should clearly establish his or her entitlement to it. The recovery should be
taxed as ordinary income.

The analyses above apply with equal force to Example 5—the soil erosion
example—and should lead to ordinary income treatment. But an additional element is
present. Section 1231 provides for capital gain treatment when real property used in a
trade or business is involuntarily converted as a result of the property’s destruction in
whole or in part. In this example, the taxpayer’s property was damaged but not
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“destroyed,” since the condominium units could still be rented. To allow capital gain
treatment here would contravene congressional purpose by allowing it in an involuntary
conversion not meeting the requirements of the statute.

Example 6—the trademark infringement case—deserves closer examination. The
case on which this example was based grew out of the decision by Standard Oil of New
Jersey to change the brand name it used on its products from Esso to Exxon. 136 The
taxpayer, a manufacturer of storage batteries that carried the trademark “Exide,” asserted
that the value of its trademark and associated goodwill would be damaged if Standard Oil
used the Exxon trademark in connection with the sale of its batteries. 137 The dispute was
settled by Standard Oil’s paying $5,000,000 to the taxpayer. 138 Significantly, the
settlement agreement permitted Standard Oil to use the term “Exxon” “anywhere in the
world in connection with any goods, products or services.” 139 The court found the
$5,000,000 payment constituted compensation for damage to the taxpayer’s Exide
trademark and associated goodwill and that it qualified for capital gain treatment to the
extent it exceeded taxpayer’s basis. 140

If that were all, the court’s decision would have to be rejected: compensation for
damage to goodwill is simply a substitute for amounts that would be taxed as ordinary
income. But that is not all: the agreement also allowed Standard Oil to use the Exxon
trademark throughout the world in connection with its batteries. The $5,000,000—or at
least a significant part of it—may therefore be viewed as consideration for a transfer of
an interest in the Exide trademark to Standard Oil in which case it would qualify as long-

44

term capital gain. Standard Oil must have found substantial merit in taxpayer’s claim
that its Exide trademark included the right to use of the word “Exxon.” Otherwise, it
would not have paid the taxpayer $5,000,000. Under the law then and now, a transfer of
an interest in a trademark will generally qualify for capital gain treatment unless the
transferor retains significant powers over the transferred interest. 141 In the latter case, the
transfer will be deemed a license and payments received under it will be taxed as
ordinary income. 142 Although the court did not pass on whether taxpayer had transferred
an interest in its Exide trademark to Standard Oil, it rejected the IRS’s contention that the
settlement agreement was a mere license. 143

Note also the difference in this example and the prior ones. In the previous
examples, the taxpayer did not transfer any interest in its property to the other party in
exchange for the payment; that was why there was no “sale or exchange.” In this case,
there was a transfer of a property interest and a concomitant receipt of money—in other
words, a “sale.”

To the extent the $5,000,000 may properly be viewed a payment in exchange for a
transfer of an interest in a trademark, capital gain treatment was appropriate.

VII.

Is the Taxation of Recoveries for Property Damage Governed by Section
1234A?
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Section 1234A accords capital gain (and capital loss) treatment to:

. . . gain or loss attributable to the cancellation, lapse, expiration, or other
termination of—

(1) a right or obligation . . . with respect to property which is (or on
acquisition would be) a capital asset in the hands of the taxpayer . . . . .

At least one commentator has speculated on whether that this section furnishes taxpayers
with an extra string to their bows in their quest for capital gain treatment. 144 The
argument for applying this section apparently is that the wrongdoer’s payment of
damages in satisfaction of his or her liability terminates the taxpayer’s right to collect
damages. This position should be rejected.

This position entails an unnatural reading of the statute. When a taxpayer collects
payment for damage to property, we do not commonly say that his rights are being
terminated or cancelled; on the contrary, we say his rights are being enforced. Payment of
damages is not described, in common usage, as a termination of plaintiff’s rights but as a
satisfaction of those rights.

Instead, the statute seems to contemplate the release or termination of a specific
right granted in a contract or other arrangement of the parties. This interpretation seems
borne out by the legislative history. All the examples in the committee reports explaining
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section 1234A cite only cases involving contractual arrangements and their terminations:
settlement of a contract to deliver a capital asset, release of a lessee from a requirement
that the premises be restored to their initial condition upon the lease’s expiration,
cancellation of contract making taxpayer sole booking agent for an entertainer, etc. 145
Nothing in the legislative history suggests that section 1234A was intended to cover
enforcement of tort claims arising from damage to one’s property. The terms
cancellation, lapse, expiration and termination are those traditionally used in capital gains
litigation involving contracts. 146

Furthermore, a taxpayer’s recovery for damage to his or her property does not
entail any of the problems section 1234A was enacted to resolve. The committee reports
list two reasons (in addition to giving more certainty to the law) for the enactment and
amendment of section 1234A: (1) to ensure that similar economic transactions are taxed
in the same manner; and (2) to deny taxpayers the option of choosing capital gain
treatment in the event of a gain and ordinary loss treatment in the case of a loss. 147

The concern that economically identical transactions might be taxed differently
arose because some courts accorded capital gain treatment for payments received for
“sale” of contractual rights (e.g., a transfer of a right to buy a mine’s output) but denied
such treatment to payments received for cancelling those rights (e.g., a mine owner’s
payment to terminate the right). This concern echoes Judge Friendly’s complaint that the
distinction was formalistic, because in both cases, the taxpayer (e.g., the party possessing
the right) was transferring property rights, the only difference being the identity of the
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transferee; in one case “a stranger” (e.g. the buyer of the right) and in the other “a person
already having a larger ‘estate’” (e.g., the mine owner). 148 Section 1234A resolved this
inconsistency by providing that cancellation of a right or obligation would give rise to
capital gain or loss.

The concern that the law (prior to section 1234A) permitted opportunistic tax
elections by taxpayers is explained in the following excerpt:

[P]resent law effectively provides, in many cases, taxpayers with an election to
treat the transaction as giving rise to capital gain, subject to more favorable rates
than ordinary income, or an ordinary loss that can offset higher-taxed ordinary
income and not be subject to limitations on use of capital losses. The effect of an
election can be achieved by selling the property right if the resulting transaction
results in a gain or providing for the extinguishment of the property right if the
resulting transaction results in a loss. 149

Section 1234A eliminated this abuse by providing for capital gain treatment whether the
property was sold or terminated.

Neither of these concerns is relevant to recoveries for injury or damage to one’s
property. No matter how the transaction is structured—either as collection of the
recovery by the taxpayer or as a sale of taxpayer’s right to the recovery—the tax result
(i.e., capital gain or ordinary income) will be the same. The identity of results precludes
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taxpayers from making the type of opportunistic tax elections described in the committee
reports.

If a recovery of damages is taxed as capital gain (as under current law), a sale of
the right to the recovery will be also taxed as capital gain. 150 On the other hand, if the
recovery is taxed as ordinary income (as advocated in this article), the proceeds from the
sale of the taxpayer’s right to the recovery will almost certainly also be taxed as ordinary
income under the “substitute for ordinary income” doctrine. 151 A sale of a right to
ordinary income, unaccompanied by a transfer of the underlying property, is a classic
“carve out” and results in ordinary income.

Unlike the income interest sold in P.G. Lake, Inc. the value of the right to pursue
a taxpayer’s claim for damage to goodwill or other property may be highly speculative
and prosecution of the claim will often entail substantial personal services by the holder
of the right. Does this difference make the “substitute for ordinary income” doctrine
inapplicable? It does not appear to do so. Even if no carve out is involved, a taxpayer’s
sale of the right to engage in a profit-seeking activity requiring personal services (e.g., a
management contract with an insurance company where compensation is based on
premiums) is generally held to produce ordinary income. 152 The rationale for these
holdings is that the amount received merely represents a substitute for the ordinary
income that the taxpayer would realize if he or she retained the right. 153 Professors
Chirelstein 154 and Del Cotto 155 have each criticized these holdings arguing that such
contractual rights should be viewed as “investments” since they are capable of market
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appreciation and depreciation like a stock or a bond. 156 Professor Del Cotto also argued
that selling such an arrangement constitutes a conversion of an investment since it shifts
the market risk to the buyer. 157 There arguments have not taken hold, 158 and their
adoption today would “virtually turn the case law . . . on its head.” 159

Finally the concern expressed in the committee reports that a transaction not
amounting to a sale or exchange (e.g., termination of the contract rights) will generate an
ordinary loss 160 cannot occur when a taxpayer receives a recovery for damage to property
that he or she retains. If the recovery is less than taxpayer’s basis, the only consequence
is that the taxpayer’s basis is reduced by the amount of the recovery. Since the taxpayer
still retains the underlying property, there is no closed or completed transaction and hence
no loss may be recognized. 161

VIII. Conclusion

Although the Internal Revenue Code makes a “sale or exchange” a precondition
to long-term capital gain treatment, courts and the IRS have frequently accorded such
treatment to recoveries for damage to the taxpayer’s property, even where the taxpayer
retains the property and engages in no sale or exchange. This article has examined
whether any policy or equitable reason justifies this disregard of the statutory injunction.
None has been found. According capital gain treatment to the recoveries does not further
either policy of the tax preference: to spur investment and to encourage the mobility of
capital. Furthermore, the recovery will often—especially in the case of damage to
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goodwill—merely represent an acceleration of amounts otherwise taxable as ordinary
income. Since these transactions do not further the policies of the capital gain tax
preference, no good reason exists to permit the actual or potential transmutation of
ordinary income into capital gain.

The IRS should explicitly state that, absent a specific statutory exception, a
transaction will not qualify for capital gain treatment unless there is a “sale or exchange”
and revoke all contrary rulings and acquiescences. Courts similarly should repudiate
cases granting capital gain relief without a sale or exchange. These actions will add
clarity and coherence to the law, implement sound policy and comply with the Code’s
explicit direction.
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